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ladimir Putin has clearly been busy setting out his manifesto for the presidential 
election, due on 4th March, with a series of extensive articles in the Russian media, 
relayed instantly and in impeccable English translations to international readerships. 
European readers of his texts will pay particular attention to what he has to say about our 
continent in his article of 27th February: 
Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe and European 
civilisation. Our citizens think of themselves as Europeans. We are by no means 
indifferent to developments in united Europe. …. I propose again that we work 
toward creating a harmonious community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, 
which will, in the future, evolve into a free trade zone and even more advanced 
forms of economic integration.1 
When Putin says that Russians think of themselves as Europeans, for their part most 
Europeans are happy about this. In the two decades since the end of the Soviet Union, West 
Europeans and Russians have begun to get to know each other better. Older generations 
from the former Soviet bloc will not forget, and may never forgive, the traumatic experience 
of the Soviet occupation in their own lifetimes. Yet the overwhelming European attitude, 
from foreign ministries to the population as a whole, is to hope for European-Russian 
relations to become more normal, as between all other nations of the continent. And ‘normal’ 
means to be open, friendly, and appreciative of the same human and cultural values, 
common human rights standards, the legal order, and above all to be devoid of mutual 
threat perceptions. For their part, foreign policy circles are looking for a convergence of 
positions on matters contributing to an enlightened, or at least soundly functioning world 
order, with particular concern for how the newly expanded collection of major world powers 
can work together.  
In this regard Putin’s texts, while mostly familiar in substance, raise a number of pointed 
issues that question the overall coherence and feasibility of his objectives. We select three of 
them here; his ideas for an economic community from Lisbon to Vladivostok; his plans for 
increased military spending, and Russia’s stance over Syria.  
                                                      
1 For full texts of this and other articles in the series see “Articles by Vladimir Putin” at: 
(http://premier.gov.ru/eng/). 
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The idea of a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok may sound utopian, but there are 
increasingly practical arguments that would warrant the EU to respond with interest. The 
status quo is a messy amalgam of competing and partly overlapping projects. The EU seeks 
to conclude deep and comprehensive free trade areas with Eastern partner states, including 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Russia has recently formed a customs union with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is also pushing Ukraine to join this union, which, however, 
would be incompatible with free trade with the EU unless the customs union also entered 
into a free trade agreement with the EU.  
Russia also seeks to expand and deepen the Eurasian Economic Area with all former Soviet 
states that are willing to do so. Neither the EU nor Russia are contemplating free trade with 
China, but Russia can see in free trade with the EU a mechanism for economic 
modernisation, and the EU is interested in economic alliances to face the competition from a 
highly competitive China. The formula to square this circle would be for the EU to add a free 
trade agreement with Russia, or presumably with the customs union of Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, to its expanding set of free trade agreements in Eastern Europe. Since Russia 
has now joined the WTO, the way is open for this. In the past Russia has viewed free trade 
with the EU as a deal that would only be to the EU’s advantage. If Putin’s view on this has 
changed, let the matter be taken up at the next EU-Russia summit. If the idea of EU-Russia 
free trade were to be taken up, the door would be open to think about a further step, namely 
to multi-lateralise a Greater European free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok; and to this 
the EU would want to consider adding, or doing first, Lisbon to Cairo, and thus a Greater 
Euro-Med free trade area. These are ideas of huge potential significance.  
Returning to Putin, later on in his articles he complains of how Russian economic interests 
are treated in the rest of the world: 
So far Russian economic actors have been getting a raw deal abroad. We are trying to 
attract foreign capital to the Russian economy. … But our investors are not welcome 
abroad and are often pointedly brushed aside.2 
It is true that the West at large is wary of big investment stakes in Russia and of Russian 
investments abroad. But has Putin adequately reflected on the reasons for this? His remarks 
are all about alleged anti-Russian sentiment and conspiracies in the world. The rest of the 
world is wary about Russia for a host of reasons: Russia has a habit of mixing geo-political 
power with commerce, including trade sanctions against East European states as a mark of 
mere political displeasure. Russia is a hazardous business environment, due to its uncertain 
rule of law. And then these economic concerns compound broader matters of political trust 
on matters of strategic security. This leads into other aspects of Putin’s current writings.  
As regards hard security matters, Putin says in his article of 20th February on defence that 
Russia is threatened by (unnamed) enemies: 
We continue to see new areas of instability and deliberately managed chaos. There 
also are purposeful attempts to provoke such conflicts even within the direct 
proximity of Russia’s and its allies’ borders.  
In response there has to be a huge expansion of military spending: 
In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern 
land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, 8 strategic ballistic missile 
submarines, about 20 multi-purpose submarines, over 50 surface warships, around 
                                                      
2 For full texts of this and other articles in the series see “Articles by Vladimir Putin” at: 
(http://premier.gov.ru/eng/). 
 SOME EUROPEAN COMMENTS ON PUTIN’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY | 3 
 
100 military spacecraft, over 600 modern aircraft including fifth generation fighter 
jets, more than 1,000 helicopters, 28 regimental kits of S-400 air defence systems, 38 
battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems, 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M missile 
systems, over 2,300 modern tanks, about 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems and 
vehicles, and more than 17,000 military vehicles.  
We have been warned! But who is threatening Russia in this way? Obviously not Europe, 
which is cutting back on its already modest military spending. Hardly China, with whom it 
has settled previous border disputes and shares the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
And is not President Obama withdrawing his military forces from Afghanistan, Iraq and 
reducing Western European bases? Russia may have soft security threats coming from its 
south in the shape of terrorism, drugs and criminality, but this is hardly a matter for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines. There is of course the threat of 
Iran’s nuclear proliferation, to which the US and NATO plans for anti-missile defences in 
Europe are addressed. Russia argues that these anti-Iranian defences might be engineered in 
a way that undermined its own strategic missile capabilities. But this rests on the strange 
logic of nuclear deterrence: these defences might be engineered in such a way as to reduce 
Russia’s capability to obliterate Western Europe and the United States. Have we not got 
beyond this? Moreover, former Finance Minister Kudrin says that Russia cannot afford this 
military spending bonanza. Or maybe with the new high oil price, Russia can at least 
temporarily fund this, but is it what the economy and society needs? Putin’s new arms build-
up seems to be ascribed to some kind of politically convenient neo-cold war mythology, or 
incredibly expensive political posturing at election time; disconnected from the real politics 
of the world at large.  
Moving on to Syria. Russia and China vetoed a resolution of the UN Security Council on the 
4th February, which was otherwise a consensus text proposed by a large group of Arab and 
Western states. The text excluded external military intervention. A similar text was put to the 
UN General Assembly on 16 February, revealing more fully who the friends of Syria are, and 
who are the supporters of a world order based on modern humanitarian norms and 
traditional security norms: 137 states voted for, 12 against, and 17 abstained. Of the 12 votes 
against, five are international pariah states: Belarus, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Iran, and Syria 
itself. Two of these are nuclear weapons proliferators and all are brutally repressive 
authoritarian regimes. Another five is a group from Latin America, led by Hugo Chavez; 
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, whose leaders pedal anti-capitalist and 
anti-American polemic, despite their disastrous economic records.  
Then there were the two big No votes: Russian and China. Of the two, Russia has taken the 
lead on Syria, given the importance of its military (naval base, arms supplies) and political 
commitments there. China has far fewer direct interests. Its joining Russia at the UNSC vote 
seems to be driven by both parties’ commitment to some kind of diplomatic mutual support 
pact: you help me here, and I’ll help you elsewhere.  
The 137 votes in favour of the Resolution saw a solid backing of Arab League states, except 
Algeria and Lebanon, all European states except Russia and Belarus, all other OECD states, 
and a considerable number of African, Asian and Latin American states, including Brazil, 
India and South Africa from the BRICs, and all G20 states except Russia and China. The 
BRIC alliance was divided down the middle, between the democrats (Brazil, India and South 
Africa) and the non-democrats (Russia and China). The democratic BRICs joined with the 
liberal democratic club of advanced nations.  
And so it was that the non-democratic BRICs  j o i n e d  u p  w i t h  t h e  b i z a r r e  g r o u p i n g  o f  
international pariah and dissident states. Should not the foreign policy planners of Russia 
and China be thinking more about the positions they adopt that lead them into this exclusive 4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
and utterly disreputable company? How can it be that Russia and China aspire to major roles 
in global affairs while keeping such alliances?  
Or, put differently, what does it mean for the possible evolution of the new world order 
when two UN Security Council veto-carrying powers find themselves only in such company 
in the UN General Assembly? The message from the current Syrian crisis is clear enough. 
The UN system has been bypassed and ad hoc coalitions are formed in its place. A first 
meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis on 24th February 
2012, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the Arab 
League, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb 
Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia and China were the notable absentees. With 
the UN structures in this way, a huge international coalition of the willing is assembled in ad 
hoc meetings elsewhere. Putin, for his part 
warns our Western colleagues against the temptation to resort to this simple, 
previously used tactic: if the UN Security Council approves of a given action, fine: if 
not, we will establish a coalition of states concerned and strike anyway.3 
Sadly, this is precisely what Russian policy is leading to, not ‘strike anyway’ since the 
Friends of Syria exclude military action, but Russia is undermining the functionality of the 
UN by adopting spoiler positions. Over Libya, Russia and China abstained, and for a 
moment it seemed that there was a partial convergence of positions with the advanced 
democracies and the Arab League. 
Both Russia and China advance normative principles, above all non-interference and 
absolute respect for the sovereignty of recognised states. These are hugely important 
principles, time-honoured since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. But the international 
system and realities of globalisation have moved on from this ‘pure’ order, if ever it existed. 
The development of international humanitarian law, the creation of the International 
Criminal Court, and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly in 2005, all amount to intrusions of international norms, law and 
institutions into the politics of the world’s sovereign states, quite apart from the long-
established intrusion of the international financial institutions into matters of economic 
sovereignty. However, over Syria it is clear from the texts that Western powers will not 
intervene militarily. But, in blocking the UN resolution, Russia and China go to the other 
extreme, signalling encouragement to the Assad regime to go on with their deadly 
bombardments.  
Russia, Europe’s big and eternal neighbour, thus finds itself in a bizarre situation. It wishes 
to be accepted as a normal civilised modern state, and to hang on to its post-World War 
ranking as a great power. But it seems convinced that it can achieve the latter only by using 
its privileged position in the UN Security Council as blocker or spoiler, thereby undermining 
the crucial matter of trust with the world’s advanced democracies. This damages both the 
country’s status in ways that are desirable for its economic modernisation, and pushes 
international diplomacy away from the forum on which it has privileged status. Will the next 
president of Russia, after the forthcoming election, reflect on these truly strategic questions 
with a more open mind? 
                                                      
3 Op. cit. 